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CHOICE OF LAW AND THE MULTISTATE CLASS:
FORUM INTERESTS IN MATTERS DISTANT
WILLIAM D. TORCHIANA-.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment1 and the full
faith and credit clause of article four 2 together limit the power of a
state to exercise jurisdiction over parties and to apply its own law in a
case over which it has jurisdiction. For a court to assert valid judicial
jurisdiction, there must be a nexus built on "certain minimum con-
tacts"3 between the the forum and nonresident defendants. 4 For choice-
of-law purposes, a court may apply forum law only when there is "a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts" between the
parties, the forum, and the litigation. 5
These principles are well established in the context of litigation
between individual parties. Class actions, however, require special con-
sideration,' and until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts7 it was unclear whether traditional choice-of-
law and jurisdictional standards applied to them.8 In Shutts, the Court
t J.D. Candidate 1986, University of Pennsylvania.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (setting forth the procedures for authenticating the acts, records,
and proceedings to which full faith and credit must be given).
3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
4 "Judicial jurisdiction" refers to the power of a state to try a case in its courts;
"legislative jurisdiction" refers to the power of a state to apply its own law to a particu-
lar matter. See, e.g., Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587-
89 (1978).
1 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (plurality opinion).
6 Class actions aim at the vindication of a large number of claims in a single
forum. The federal rules and most state rules governing class actions provide for the
use of class representatives, special res judicata significance for class judgments, and
special notice and jurisdictional requirements. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23; ALA. R.
Civ. P. 23. For a discussion of the historical background of the federal class action rule,
see 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (1972
& Supp. 1985).
7 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
8 For varying approaches to choice-of-law questions in multistate class actions
before Shutts, see Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981) (deciding
to apply forum law with the proviso that if necessary other states' laws could be ap-
plied in accordance with established choice-of-law principles), cert. dismissed per
curiam, 459 U.S. 86 (1982); Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d
1159 (1984) (certifying a multistate class under Kansas law despite acknowledged
(913)
914 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
lowered the jurisdictional threshold in multistate plaintiff class actions.
As a result, courts may now exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
plaintiff class members for whom traditionally recognized jurisdictional
contacts are entirely lacking, provided only that those class members
are given notice and an opportunity to opt out of the action.9 At the
same time, the Shutts Court held that traditional choice-of-law stan-
dards govern class actions, thereby forbidding courts from applying fo-
rum law to nonresident plaintiff class members with whom the forum
does not have "significant" choice-of-law contacts.1 In Shutts, the Su-
choice-of-law problems), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 86 Wisc. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978) (certifying a multistate class under
Wisconsin law despite the absence of traditional choice-of-law contacts).
The question of the jurisdictional standards applicable to nonresident plaintiff
class members has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State
Courts over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1957)
(discussing the states' judicial power over nonresidents in the context of Erlanger Mills,
Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956)); von Mehren & Traut-
man, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121
(1966) (proposing new terminology for use in analyzing problems of judicial jurisdic-
tion); Note, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in the Certification of
Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 517 (1983) (discussing the special problems of class certification in mass tort
actions and proposing an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982) (governing multidis-
trict litigation)); Comment, Jurisdiction over Unnamed Plaintiffs in Multistate Class
Actions, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 181 (1985) (advancing the argument-rejected in
Shutts-that traditional "minimum contacts" jurisdictional limits should be applied to
nonresident plaintiff class members); Note, Personal Jurisdiction and Multistate
Plaintiff Class Actions: The Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32
DRAKE L. REv. 441 (1983) (identifying and discussing various individual and state
interests at issue in class actions involving multistate plaintiffs); Note, Multistate Plain-
tiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV. L. REV. 718 (1979) (dis-
cussing the jurisdictional contacts requirements and res judicata effects of multistate
plaintiff class actions) [hereinafter cited as Note, Jurisdiction and Certification]; Com-
ment, Jurisdiction and Notice in Class Actions: "Playing Fair" with National Clas-
ses, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1487 (1984) (arguing that traditional due process safeguards,
such as the minimum contacts requirement, do not apply to class actions) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Jurisdiction and Notice].
A number of commentators have briefly discussed the relationship between the
constitutional limits on choice of forum law and those on judicial jurisdiction. While
most of them do not expressly consider choice of law and jurisdiction in the class action
setting, but see Note, Jurisdiction and Certification, supra, at 733, they do speak to
the topic in terms of other litigation. See, e.g., Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REv. 1015, 1065 (1983) (suggesting that federalism is
more threatened by improper choice-of-law decisions than by jurisdictional "reaching
out"); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv.
185, 202 (1976) (comparing jurisdictional and choice-of-law standards); Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 89 (1978) (suggesting
that constitutional limits on choice of law should provide the basis for limits on judicial
jurisdiction, rather than vice versa); von Mehren & Trautman, supra, at 1130-31
("[C]ourts and commentators are likely to become increasingly aware of choice of law
as an element to be considered in thinking about adjudicatory jurisdiction . . .
" See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2976-77.
10 See id. at 2980.
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preme Court has in effect told lower courts that they "'can't cavalierly
apply a single law to a case . . . [and] must [now] think about apply-
ing multiple state laws'" to the claims of nonresident plaintiff class
members.""
Class action procedure, however, operates to precisely the opposite
effect. Aimed at providing a fair and efficient means of mass dispute
resolution, the procedural rules require that there be issues of law or
fact that are common to the class, 2 that such common questions
predominate over individual questions of law or fact," and that the
class action be superior to other methods for the adjudication of the
controversy;1 4 pertinent to the question of superiority is the degree of
difficulty in managing the litigation. 5 These procedural requirements
encourage courts to avoid the application of potentially diverse "multi-
ple state laws" either by applying forum law uniformly to the claims of
all class members or by dismissing the class action altogether. As a re-
sult, courts that exercise jurisdiction over multistate plaintiff class ac-
tions are now placed in a difficult position: the class action rules en-
courage the application of forum law while Shutts may require
otherwise. This conflict must be resolved if class actions are to remain
an available instrument for resolving complex disputes.
This Comment explores the choice-of-law issues that courts now
face when they assert jurisdiction over multistate plaintiff class actions.
Part I sets forth the constitutional limitations on the power of a court to
apply forum law to a case and to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
parties. Part II examines how choice-of-law issues are shaped by the
requirements of class action procedure in light of Shutts. Part III sug-
gests several approaches to class actions that present choice-of-law
problems, concluding that, through the proper use of subclasses, partial
dismissal, and certification of questions of foreign law, the constitu-
tional concerns of Shutts can be met without destroying the viability of
the class action device.
u Greenhouse, Class Actions: A Key Ruling, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at D2,
col. I (quoting Professor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School, who argued Shutts
before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Phillips Petroleum Company).
" See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2); see also infra note 76 (discussing the procedural
rules employed in state courts).
IS See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
14 See id.
'5 See Fa.. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW AND
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
A. The Choice of Forum Law
1. Individual Litigation
The Supreme Court established the modern constitutional limita-
tions on choice of law in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague."6 In Hague,
a plurality of the Court, along with Justice Stevens in concurrence,
upheld a Minnesota court's application of Minnesota law to a case in-
volving the death of a Wisconsin resident in an accident in Wisconsin."7
At issue was the interpretation of insurance policies made in Wisconsin
for the decedent's automobile, which had been registered in Wisconsin.
The contacts between Minnesota and the litigation were slim,"8 and
under most choice-of-law theories Wisconsin law would have been ap-
plied to the case. 9 Nevertheless, the Court held that Minnesota's use of
forum law was constitutional.
The plurality opinion stated that "for a State's substantive law to
be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair."2 Thiis choice-of-law standard embodies two distinct
interests. The first-fairness to the parties-is reflected in the require-
ment that the choice of a state's law must be "neither arbitrary nor
449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion).
17 See id. at 305; id. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
18 See id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19 See id. at 331-32; see also Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the
Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10
HOFSTRA L. REv. 103, 105 & nn.8-10 (1981) (arguing that the facts of Hague point
to an application of Wisconsin law under a number of different choice-of-law theories).
The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws would point to Wisconsin under the "place
of the wrong" rule if the action is characterized as one in tort, and also to Wisconsin
under the "place of contracting" rule if the action is characterized as one in contract.
See Silberman, supra, at 105 & nn.8-9. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
would point to the law of the state with "the most significant relationship" to the
litigation for purposes of either tort or contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 188 (1971). The contacts relevant to choice-of-law decisions
in tort actions are the place of injury; the domicile, residency, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties; the situs of the injury; and the place
where the relationship between the parties is centered. See id. § 145(2). The contacts
relevant to choice-of-law decisions in contract actions are the place of contracting; the
place of negotiation; the place of performance; the location of the subject matter of the
contract; and the domicile, residence, and place of business of the parties. See id.
§ 188(2). The "most significant relationship" test, given the facts of Hague, would
point to Wisconsin law. See Silberman, supra, at 105.
20 Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13.
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fundamentally unfair."2 The Minnesota court clearly had jurisdiction
over the parties. The defendant did business in the state, and the plain-
tiff, who had recently become a Minnesota resident, voluntarily came
before the court to institute the suit.2" Nevertheless, the plurality dis-
claimed the view that contacts sufficient to support an assertion of juris-
diction would automatically ensure that a choice of forum law would
be fair.23 Instead, for the choice of forum law to be fair, contacts be-
tween the forum and the parties must be of such a nature that the
parties might have expected their activities to be judged under forum
law.24 On this point, the plurality noted that due to the insurance com-
pany's business presence in Minnesota it could "hardly claim ...sur-
prise that the state courts might apply forum law to litigation in which
the company is involved."2 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
observed in a similar vein that a choice of forum law would result in
unfairness, and thus violate the due process clause, when litigants
"could not reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later be
judged by [forum] law."
'26
The second interest promoted by the Hague standard is the federal
interest in ensuring that each state respects the other states' legitimate
interests and avoids infringing upon their sovereignty.2 7 This interest
limits the extent to which a state may reach out to apply its law to a
case involving parties and events that lie outside it. Thus, the plurality
required not only that there be significant contacts among the forum,
the parties, and the litigation, but also that these contacts create "state
interests" in applying forum law.28 Applying this analysis to the facts
of Hague, the plurality opinion found that the state of Minnesota had
three categories of interests in the application of its law. First, the dece-
dent's employment in Minnesota gave rise to "police power responsibil-
21 Id. at 313.
22 See id. at 317-18.
23 See id. at 320 n.29. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted that "[tihe
Court has made it clear over the years that the personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law
inquiries are not the same." Id. at 321 n.3. The Court emphasized this distinction in
Shutts, holding that a state "may not use [an] assumption of jurisdiction as an added
weight in the scale when considering the permissible constitutional limits on choice of
substantive law." Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2980; see also Drobak, supra note 8, at 1065
("If there is a threat to federalism or state sovereignty in a multistate class action, it
comes from improper choice of law, not jurisdiction. Effective limits on choice of
law ...should satisfy that concern."); Silberman, supra note 8, at 79-90 (discussing
interplay between jurisdiction and choice of law).
24 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24.
25 Id. at 317-18.
26 Id. at 327.
" See id. at 320.
28 See id. at 313.
1986]
918 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ities . . . that are analogous . . . [to those] towards residents.""9 Sec-
ond, the defendant's in-state business activities created a regulatory
interest on Minnesota's part.30 Finally, the decedent's widow's post-
accident move to Minnesota gave that state "an interest in [her] recov-
ery, . . . [namely] to keep [her] 'off welfare rolls' and able 'to meet
financial obligations.' "31
The reason for the "state interests" requirement becomes apparent
upon considering the effect of a court's application of forum law to
matters affecting nonresidents. A state court applying its law to a
multistate plaintiff class disregards any interests other states may have
in applying their laws to the matters from which the dispute arose. In
so doing, the forum encroaches upon the rights of other states to adjudi-
cate disputes according to the social and economic policies enacted by
their legislatures or formed by their courts. To the extent that one state
is thus able to export its domestic law, neighboring states lose "the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of [their] neigh-
bors."'3 2 Unless the forum state has sufficient interests of its own in the
matter, application of its law unnecessarily infringes upon the sover-
eignty of those states whose interests it has disregarded and undermines
the concerns of interstate federalism.
2. Class Actions
The Supreme Court held in Shutts that the constitutional limits
announced in Hague "must be respected even in a nationwide class
action."33 Thus, in a class action a court may apply forum law to the
claims of any particular plaintiff in the class only if the forum has
significant contacts with that plaintiff. These contacts must create state
interests in applying forum law, and an application of forum law must
29 Id. at 314.
3O See id. at 318.
31 Id. at 319 (citation omitted) (quoting Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d
43, 49 (Minn. 1978), affid, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)). But see id. at 332 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing these contacts and interests as "trivial").
82 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Justice Bran-
deis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), spoke of the
ability of each state to "try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." Id. at 311. Such experiments will pose a risk to the rest of the
country, or at least prevent other states from trying different experiments, to the extent
that the "experimenting" state is able to apply its law to transactions beyond its bor-
ders. See 3 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcnroNs § 13.28, at 63 (2d ed. 1985)
("The simple institution of a multistate class suit in one forum cannot provide the
foundation for applying that forum's law to nonresidents, without creating a 'substan-
tial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism.' ") (quoting Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 n.24 (1979)).
' Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2981.
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not unfairly frustrate the parties' expectations about which law would
govern their actions. 4
The decision in Shutts helps to protect federalism concerns by en-
suring that plaintiffs cannot use the class action as a vehicle for forum
shopping.35 Prior to Shutts, plaintiffs could bring class actions in the
state whose laws were most favorable to their claims, knowing that fo-
rum law would be applied to the claims of the entire class despite the
absence of contacts between the forum and most of the individual class
members. Without restrictions on the application of forum law to the
entire class, there was nothing to prevent such forum shopping. This
process threatened to balkanize the federal system by allowing certain
states to become centers for class action litigation because of the attrac-
tiveness of their laws to class claims. Kansas, for example, became a
center for oil and gas litigation of the type seen in Shutts.37 Judgments
in such suits effectively forced the forum's legislative and judicial poli-
cies upon the rest of the nation. Shutts has largely foreclosed this
possibility.
In the case of class members to whom forum law cannot be ap-
plied under the Hague standard, a court adjudicating a class action
must embark on a rather complex choice-of-law analysis. First, it must
decide, based on the choice-of-law rules of the forum, what law will
apply to plaintiffs not covered by forum law. The court must then ex-
amine the foreign law or laws so selected and compare them to the laws
of the forum. If the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum
there is no conflict, and in such a case "[t]here can be no injury in
applying [forum] law." ' In choice-of-law parlance, such a case
presents a "false" conflict. 9 In the case of a "true" conflict, in which
See id. at 2980.
See id. at 2979 (citing Hague, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
36 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 11, at D2, col. 3 (" 'For instance, if you
brought your royalty case in Kansas [prior to Shutts], it had a lot more oomph to it.
The Shutts case will prevent the creation of these havens.' ") (quoting Professor Arthur
R. Miller).
37 In addition to Shutts, such cases include Wortman v. Sun Oil Co., 236 Kan.
266, 690 P.2d 385 (1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 40 (1985); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Gray v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 1 Kan. App. 2d 338, 564 P.2d 579 (1977), modified, 223 Kan. 441, 573 P.2d
1080 (1978). In an amicus brief filed in Shutts, the Consumer Coalition listed multi-
state class actions litigated in state courts between 1838 and 1980. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae (The Consumer Coalition) at app. A, Shutts. Ten of the 15 most recent cases
on this list were litigated in either Kansas or Illinois, the site of Miner v. Gillette Co.,
87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. dismissed per curiam, 459 U.S. 86 (1982),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 68-74, and a number of other consumer-re-
lated class actions.
38 Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2977.
39 See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 93 (3d ed. 1977); E. SCOLES &
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forum and foreign law actually differ, the court must apply foreign law
to the plaintiff class members' claims.
Some of the difficulties in this process are well illustrated by the
Shutts case itself. The plaintiff class in Shutts consisted of 28,100 oil
and gas royalty owners who sued the Phillips Petroleum Company for
interest on royalty payments that Phillips had withheld pursuant to an
order of the Federal Power Commission. 0 Ninety-seven percent of the
class members had "no apparent connection" to Kansas, the forum
state. 41 The plaintiffs came from all fifty states, as well as some foreign
countries, and most of the lands from which royalties were due were
located in Texas and Oklahoma;42 the rest were located in nine other
states, including Kansas."8 Despite the slim contacts between Kansas,
the litigation, and the plaintiff class, the court certified the class, ap-
plied Kansas common law to the case, and found the defendants liable
for several million dollars of interest." The Supreme Court subse-
quently ruled that the choice of Kansas law was unconstitutional and
asked the Kansas Supreme Court, on remand, to make its choice-of-law
decision according to the dictates of Hague.45
On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court could constitutionally ap-
ply its own law only to those few hundred members of the class who
had sufficient contacts with Kansas. Given Kansas' lack of interest in
the remaining claims 4"-those of ninety-seven percent of the 28,100
class members-the Kansas court must employ foreign law to decide all
but a small fraction of the claims advanced by the class, except to the
extent that it finds no conflict between applicable foreign law and Kan-
sas oil and gas law. The number of other states' laws to be considered
by the Kansas court on remand is at least two and is probably eleven.4
Moreover, with respect to one of these states, Oklahoma, the
Court noted that "there is no recorded decision dealing with interest
liability for suspended royalties: whether Oklahoma is likely to impose
P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.6 (1982); see also 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32,
§ 13.28, at 63 (suggesting, prior to the United States Supreme Court's contrary find-
ings, that Shutts involved only a "false" conflict).
4 Shutts, 235 Kan. at 197, 679 P.2d at 1165.
41 Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2977.
42 Shutts, 235 Kan. at 199, 679 P.2d at 1166.
43 Id. at 197, 679 P.2d at 1165.
44 Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2978; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 16, Shutts
(asserting that application of Texas law to claims concerning Texas leases would have
reduced Phillips' liability for interest on those claims from approximately $5.6 million
to approximately $2.0 million).
45 See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2981.
46 See id. at 2980.
47 See id. at 2977-78 & n.6.
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liability would require a survey of Oklahoma oil and gas law. ' 48 As a
result, even the preliminary task of ascertaining whether foreign law is
in conflict with forum law will be a daunting task. With a nationwide
class numbering in the thousands and a difficult choice-of-law analysis,
Shutts fulfills Justice Stevens' prediction in Hague that judges "may
find it difficult and time consuming to discover and apply correctly the
law of another State. ' 49 Given the complexity of the choice-of-law
analysis that the trial court would otherwise have faced, one can easily
appreciate its decision to apply Kansas law uniformly to the class
before it.
B. Jurisdiction over Nonresident Parties
The two interests identified in Hague-fairness to the parties and
interstate federalism-are also protected by constitutional limits on a
state's ability to assert jurisdiction over nonresident parties. These lim-
its are important for their similarity to choice-of-law restrictions and
for the special jurisdictional standards that apply to plaintiff class
members.
1. Jurisdiction over Nonresident Defendants
State judicial jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is limited by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."' A state may ex-
ercise jurisdiction only when the nonresident defendant has "certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.' ,,51 The minimum contacts standard
can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable,
functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system. 2
48 Id. at 2977-78.
49 Hague, 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Shutts, the Supreme
Court of Kansas, approving the trial court's decision not to embark on a choice-of-law
analysis of the claims before it, asserted that "the law of the forum should be applied
unless compelling reasons exist for applying a different law." Shutts, 235 Kan. at 221,
679 P.2d at 1180-81.
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Mil-
liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
"2 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
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Although personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law inquiries are not
necessarily identical,5" the above passage touches on both aspects of the
choice-of-law standard enunciated in Hague. The fairness issue in the
jurisdictional inquiry concerns the forum in which a defendant might
be forced to litigate. In the choice-of-law inquiry, however, the fairness
issue concerns which substantive law will be applied in judging the
defendant's conduct. The potential for unfairness is arguably greater
when a court chooses to apply forum law than when it simply asserts
jurisdiction. As one commentator has succinctly noted, to argue other-
wise is to argue "that an accused is more concerned with where he will
be hanged than whether."" This assumes, of course, that once a de-
fendant has arrived at a distant or inconvenient forum, choice-of-law
rules will point to the law of a jurisdiction with which the defendant's
contacts were "significant." 5
The Court linked federalism concerns to personal jurisdiction in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.56 In that case, the Court noted
that jurisdictional contacts must be "reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government."' 57 The Court further suggested that due
process limitations on state jurisdiction advanced the "fair and orderly
administration of the laws." 8 Again, however, the consequences of
reaching out to assert jurisdiction may not be as severe as the conse-
11 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 320 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While it has been
suggested that [the] minimum-contacts analysis [applied to personal jurisdiction] be
used to define the constitutional limitations on choice of law, the Court has made it
clear over the years that the personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law inquiries are not
the same.") (citations omitted).
" Silberman, supra note 8, at 88; cf. R. GRAVESON, Choice of Law and Choice of
Jurisdiction in the English Conflict of Laws, in COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS
99, 112 (1977):
On general grounds it would seem sound to suggest that the question
of choice of law is more important than that of choice of jurisdiction. It is
more in the interests of uniformity of decision, of justice, and of the parties
themselves that the proper law should be applied to the merits of their
dispute than that some law should be applied by the courts of one country
rather than those of another.
55 This argument also assumes that the forum will construe foreign laws correctly.
Because a judge in State A will rarely behave precisely like a judge in State B or C,
however, one cannot say in the abstract that foreign law will be construed '"just like" it
would be in the foreign jurisdiction itself. Shutts is a classic example. The trial court
decided that applicable foreign law did not conflict with Kansas law and applied Kan-
sas law to the entire 28,100-member class. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that
other states' laws did conflict with the laws of Kansas and that the defendant's liability
would be greatly reduced by the proper application of foreign law to the claims against
it. See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2978.
56 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
57 Id. at 317.
58 Id. at 319.
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quences of reaching out to apply forum law. An overbroad assertion of
jurisdiction merely deprives another state of the opportunity to hear a
particular case; in an age of crowded dockets, this may not be wholly
unwelcome. A state's assertion of jurisdiction should not, of itself, give
offense to other states with an interest in the litigation, because when
conflicts rules point to another state's substantive laws a forum should
either apply those laws 59 or decline jurisdiction under forum non con-
veniens principles.00
2. Jurisdiction over Plaintiff Class Members
In Shutts the Court held that the "minimum contacts" require-
ment applicable to a state's exercise of judicial jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants does not apply to nonresident members of a plaintiff
class.61 According to the Court, the touchstone for jurisdiction over
plaintiffs in class actions is "minimal procedural due process protec-
tion," 2 which requires only that class members receive notice of the
action and have the opportunity to "opt out" of the litigation. 3
This requirement is understandable given the reasons for the min-
imum contacts standard for judicial jurisdiction. The minimum contacts
standard allows defendants to avoid "the burdens of litigating in a dis-
tant or inconvenient forum."" This concern does not exist for plaintiffs
69 See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 668
(1959). An example is World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), in
which the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction over a case
involving an auto accident within its borders was improper because the state had no
other contacts with the parties and the litigation. New York had the most substantial
contacts in the case. Nevertheless, if the Oklahoma court applied New York products
liability law, its assertion of jurisdiction alone presumably would not have "offended"
New York or violated the parties' due process rights under Hague. For an argument in
support of the contrary view-that a Hague analysis would have supported an applica-
tion of Oklahoma law in World-Wide Volkswagen-see Lowenfeld & Silberman,
Choice of Law and the Supreme Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 841, 852 (1981).
60 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 228 n.8 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) ("[Ihf a preferable forum exists elsewhere, a State that is
constitutionally entitled to accept jurisdiction nonetheless remains free to arrange for
the transfer of the litigation under the doctrine offorum non conveniens."); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) ("For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."). See generally Stein, Forum Non Con-
veniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781
(1985) (analyzing the relationship between the forum non conveniens doctrine and
other standards used to control access to the courts).
1 See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
62 Id.
6" See id.
" World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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in a class action: class action procedure does not require the presence of
most class members in court.6 5 Likewise, in terms of interstate federal-
ism, plaintiff class members voluntarily submit to jurisdiction by declin-
ing to opt out of the class. Thus, the state is not reaching out jurisdic-
tionally, but rather is allowing itself to be used as a forum for the
resolution of class claims.
This lower jurisdictional requirement allows multistate plaintiff
class actions to proceed in cases in which many class members have had
no contact with the forum. Indeed, given the inhospitality of the federal
courts to class action suits,66 this lower jurisdictional standard is all that
keeps the multistate class action a viable form of litigation.67
Miner v. Gillette Co."8 provides a good example of the jurisdic-
tional standards applicable to plaintiff class members. Miner was an
Illinois class action involving a plaintiff class of 180,000 members, of
whom roughly ninety-five percent were nonresidents."9 The court had
jurisdiction over the defefidant by virtue of its business activities in Illi-
nois, and it asserted jurisdiction over the plaintiff class solely on the
11 See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 14, 428 N.E.2d 478, 482 ("[The
class action suit] does not contemplate or necessitate the appearance of absent parties."),
cert. dismissed per curiam, 459 U.S. 86 (1982), quoted in Comment, Jurisdiction and
Notice, supra note 8, at 1500.
88 The Supreme Court has severely limited the use of class action procedure in the
federal courts. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359-64 (1978)
(Class representatives must pay the costs of ascertaining class membership.); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-76 (1974) (Rule 23(b)(3) class actions require
individual notice to plaintiff class members regardless of the cost of such notice.); Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1973) (Each class member's claim in
a diversity action must exceed the $10,000 minimum amount required for the assertion
of jurisdiction.); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) (The various claims in a
class action may not be aggregated to provide the $10,000 amount in controversy re-
quired for diversity jurisdiction.).
This does not mean, however, that the federal courts are closed to all class actions.
Federal courts are still open to class actions brought under federal question jurisdiction,
such as antitrust actions, actions under the securities acts, consumer actions under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), and actions brought
under various other federal statutes allowing private rights of action. In any such ac-
tions, plaintiffs may also advance state law claims to the extent permitted under pen-
dent jurisdiction doctrine.
17 See Greenhouse, supra note 11, at D2, col. 2 (" 'If [Shutts] had gone the other
way, it would have largely closed the door to nationwide class actions in state courts by
undercutting the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to put together large classes.' ") (quoting
Professor Lea Brilmayer of Yale Law School); see also Hearings on S. 3201 Before
the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 277
(1970) (statement of J. Dushoff, a class action plaintiff's attorney) ("The 'promise' of
the federal [consumer] class action was nipped in the bud by the unfortunate decision in
[Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969)].") (footnote omitted).
87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. dismissed per curiam, 459 U.S. 86
(1982).
9 See id. at 21-22, 428 N.E.2d at 486 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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basis of the opt-out notice sent to class members by the class
representatives.
70
The members of the plaintiff class in Miner were victims of a
failed promotional scheme that Gillette, a Delaware corporation head-
quartered in Massachusetts,7 1 had operated through an intermediary
company located in Minnesota.72 Thus, for nonresident class members,
the only contact with Illinois was the litigation itself: no prelitigation
event linked them to the forum. A full-blown "minimum contacts" re-
quirement for jurisdiction over the plaintiffs would have meant that the
class could not have been certified as constituted. The Illinois court ap-
plied a more lenient standard, however, and proceeded to certify the
class.
7 3
II. CHOICE OF LAW AND CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
As has been seen, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague4 requires that
there be "significant contacts" between the forum, the parties, and the
litigation and that these contacts give rise to forum "state interests"
before a court may constitutionally apply forum law to a case. At the
same time, Shutts now allows courts to exercise jurisdiction over plain-
tiff class members who have no contacts at all with the forum. For
these class members, the Hague choice-of-law requirement of "signifi-
cant contacts" creating "state interests" will not be met. Under Shutts,
their claims must be adjudicated under law chosen according to the
choice-of-law rules of the forum. Current federal7 5 and state78 class ac-
tion procedure, however, encourages courts either to apply a single law
to class members' claims or to dismiss the action altogether. This sec-
tion sets forth the fundamental conflict between the goals of class action
70 See id. at 13-16, 428 N.E.2d at 481-83.
71 See id. at 21, 428 N.E.2d at 486 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
72 See id.
73S See id. at 20, 428 N.E.2d at 485.
- 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion).
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
78 For an exhaustive survey and comprehensive listing of the rules in all 50 states,
as well as of all state and federal class actions brought since the 1966 amendments to
Rule 23, see 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, at 105-83 (state class action rules); 5 id.
at 262-83 (state class actions); id. at 4-261 (federal class actions, arranged topically and
by court and judge).
The following discussion of the influences of class action procedure concerns fed-
eral actions involving questions of state law through pendent jurisdiction, federal causes
of action that look to or incorporate state law on certain matters, and state actions
brought in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have adopted either the fed-
eral rules, FED. R. Crv. P. 23, or the Uniform Class Actions Rule, 12 U.L.A. 23
(Supp. 1986). See also infra note 97 (discussing choice-of-law problems presented in
federal class actions).
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procedure and the constitutional requirements for the application of fo-
rum law.
A. Requirements for Maintaining a Class Action
1. Commonality and Predominance
An action may be maintained as a class action only if it involves
questions of law or fact common to the class.77 Moreover, in a Rule
23(b)(3) action these common questions of law or fact must
predominate over any questions of law or fact affecting only individual
members of the classy.7 If issues of fact are not common to the class,
and the forum must apply multiple laws, then neither questions of fact
nor questions of law will be common to the class and the action will not
satisfy even the threshold commonality requirement. If questions of fact
are common, but multiple questions of law exist, then the common
questions of fact will not "predominate" over the individual questions
of law, and the action will fall the predominance test."
In class actions such as Shutts and Miner, involving plaintiffs
from numerous foreign jurisdictions who have little or no contact with
the forum, application of multiple states' laws will mean that the re-
quirements of commonality and predominance will not be met. Specifi-
cally, questions of law will not be "common" to a class and common
questions will not "predominate," and after Shutts a court may not
satisfy these requirements simply by deciding to apply forum law uni-
formly to all claims.80
2. Manageability
The manageability requirement for maintaining certain class ac-
tions also encourages courts either to apply a single law to the claims of
a multistate class or to dismiss the class altogether. Rule 23(b)(3) re-
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The presence of common issues of fact or law is a
prerequisite to any action under Rule 23 or the state rules that follow it. See id. It is
also a prerequisite to an action under the Uniform Class Actions Rule. See UNIF.
CLASS AcnONs RULE § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1986). Under the 1938 Field Code
rules, it is required in the case of a "spurious" class action. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 6, at § 1752.
78 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Under the Uniform Class Actions Rule, predomi-
nance is a "relevant factor" in the decision to certify any class action. See UNIF. CLASS
AcTIONs RuLE § 3(a)(5), 12 U.L.A. 26 (Supp. 1986). "Choice of law problems" are
another factor. See id. § (3)(a)(12), 12 U.L.A. at 26.
• See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 32, at §§ 4.25-.26.
o See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2980 ("A state may not take a transaction with little
or no relationship to the forum and apply the law of the forum in order to satisfy the
procedural requirement that there be a "'common question of law.' ").
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quires that the court find "that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy. . . The matters pertinent to the findings include . . . the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the class
action." 8'
In any case in which there are class members who have insuffi-
cient contact with the forum to support the application of forum law,
the court must investigate the forum's choice-of-law rules as they apply
to each plaintiff, select the appropriate foreign law, and determine
whether that law conflicts with forum law. If the class members hail
from many states, such an undertaking would make the class action
unmanageable even if the law of most of the foreign states were ulti-
mately found to be the same as the law of the forum. In this way, the
requirement that the class action be superior to other methods for the
efficient adjudication of the controversy encourages courts either to ap-
ply forum law uniformly or to deny certification altogether.
8 2
B. Judicial Responses: Choosing Forum Law or Denying
Certification
1. Choosing Forum Law
Prior to Shutts, many courts solved the commonality, preponder-
ance, and manageability problems by choosing forum law in the face of
a conflict, either ignoring or failing to recognize the possibility that
choice-of-law principles or the Constitution might demand otherwise.83
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). Similarly, the Uniform Class Actions Rule directs
a court to consider whether "management of the class action poses unusual difficulties"
and whether "any conflict of laws issues pose unusual difficulties" before it decides to
certify a class action. UNIF. CLAss ACTIONS RULE § 3(11)-(12), 12 U.L.A. 26 (Supp.
1986).
" See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir.) ("The
management of a class action with many thousands of class members imposes tremen-
dous burdens on overtaxed district courts .... "), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975);
Elster v. Alexander, 76 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (reasoning that because of
choice-of-law problems treatment of a rule 10b-5 claim "in a class action . . .would
create a judicial nightmare" and holding that "the problems of manageability . . .pre-
clude this action from being treated as a class action"), appeal dismissed per curiam,
608 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1979); Schmidt v. Interstate Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 74
F.R.D. 423, 429 (D.D.C. 1977) (denying certification because the choice-of-law
problems would "undoubtedly complicate the proceedings and heighten the un-
manageability that already inheres in class suits"); Causey v. Pan American World
Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975) (denying certification because "conflict
of law questions would be extremely complex").
13 For example, the Kansas Supreme Court discussed the choice-of-law questions
in Shutts at some length without a single reference to Hague. See Shutts, 235 Kan. at
221-22, 679 P.2d at 1181.
19861
928 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
This approach allowed such class actions to proceed and thus permitted
courts to conserve judicial resources by resolving a large number of
claims in a single action. 4 It also allowed courts to avoid the difficulty
of first ascertaining and then applying the foreign law or laws appro-
priate to the class.85 Under this approach, all questions of law were
questions of forum law and thus common and predominant, and such
actions remained manageable.
In re Saxon Securities Litigation"6 provides an example of the
uniform application of a single state's law to a multistate class. In
" Class action procedure facilitates the resolution of a large number of related
claims in a single forum, and as such is more efficient than the alternative of having a
great number of actions brought in different jurisdictions. Dismissal on choice-of-law
grounds would frustrate this purpose. See infra text accompanying note 107. The ac-
commodation of serious choice-of-law problems through the use of numerous subclasses
is also inefficient, because a single trial judge will in effect have to conduct multiple
trials. The Court in Shutts, however, made light of this concern in stating that the
choice-of-law decision may not be "altered by the fact that it may be more difficult or
more burdensome to comply with the constitutional limitations because of the large
number of transactions which the State proposes to adjudicate and which have little
connection with the forum." Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2980; see also Simon v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he geo-
graphical dispersion of the alleged [fraudulent] representations would bring into issue
various state common law standards. With no single law governing the entire class,
common issues of law cannot be shown to warrant Rule 23 treatment."); Schlosser v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wisc. 2d 226, 241, 271 N.W.2d 879, 886 (1978) ("[T]he
judicial task is simplified by applying the law of a single forum to [class actions].").
85 As Justice Stevens noted in Hague, "This task can be particularly difficult for
a trial judge who does not have ready access to a law library containing the statutes and
decisions of all 50 states." 449 U.S. at 326 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Behr,
Judge in Pennzoil-Texaco Lawsuit Reportedly Has Doubts About Case, Washington
Post, Apr. 12, 1986, at G1, col. 3:
[Judge Solomon Casseb, Jr.] said his instructions to the jury were based
on "what I felt was the procedure in following the New York law as to
what constituted . . . a binding agreement between the parties."
"Now if it was in Texas, you had to have that baby in writing all the
way and signed," he told [a group of] California lawyers. "No question
you had to have a contract."
But Casseb said that as he interpreted New York law and legal
precedents, a binding agreement did not require a definitive, written con-
tract. "You know, this is my first experience in trying to analyze New
York law after I did 46 years with Texas," he said. "So you can see, that
[misinterpretation] can happen to any judge."
The Kansas Supreme Court in Shutts noted that the trial court had not examined
the choice-of-law issues presented by the case. See Shutts, 235 Kan. at 221, 679 P.2d at
1180-81. The trial judge in Shutts has decided a number of other massive oil and gas
class actions involving nonresident plaintiff classes and difficult choice-of-law issues,
and he has generally applied Kansas common law to the entire class. See, e.g., Sterling
v. Superior Oil Co., 222 Kan. 737, 567 P.2d 1325 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067
(1978); Maddox v. Gulf Oil Co., 222 Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1065 (1978).




Saxon, the plaintiffs pleaded pendent state law fraud claims in a class
action alleging securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." The court chose to reject a magistrate's recommendation that
the state law claims not be certified because of choice-of-law and man-
ageability problems.88 Because of an apparent lack of "significant vari-
ations" in the various states' treatment of common-law fraud, the court
concluded, "it may well be reasonable to apply the law of New York to
all of the non-residents' claims or to allow both sides to explore the
possibility of picking another state's laws to be applied uniformly. ' 8'9
The court avoided even the preliminary task of ascertaining the partic-
ular laws to which New York's conflicts rules might have pointed.
In Shutts, the trial court took a similar approach. The court ap-
plied forum law to the multistate class, recognizing that "[w]hen liabil-
ity is to be determined according to varying and inconsistent state laws,
the common question of law or fact prerequisite . . .will not be ful-
filled."9 0 The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court
had not examined the choice-of-law issues, 1 but approved the applica-
tion of forum law nevertheless, stating that "[t]he general rule is that
the law of the forum applies."9 2
2. Denying Certification
Some courts have responded to the problems created by the proce-
dural need to apply forum law by simply refusing to certify the class
and dismissing the case. In Chmieleski v. City Products Corp.,93 a
plaintiff class brought state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty
pendent to a federal antitrust action."' These claims concerned contracts
for franchise stores located in 48 states.9 5 The court denied class certifi-
cation with respect to the state law claims on the grounds that the pre-
87 See id. at 97,776 (referring to SEC Rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1985) (implementing section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982)).
88 See id. at 97,776-77.
8, Id. at 97,777 (citations omitted). The Saxon court indicated that if the state law
claims before it were to become "unmanageable," id., it might decertify the class. A
concern for manageability, however, only reinforces the tendency to apply forum law to
a class action, since it is the most "manageable" law a forum could select. See supra
notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
90 Shutts, 235 Kan. at 212, 679 P.2d at 1175 (citing Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 222 Kan. 527, 557, 567 P.2d 1292, 1314 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068
(1978)).
91 See id. at 221, 679 P.2d at 1180-81.
92 Id. at 221, 679 P.2d at 1181.
9 71 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
94 See id. at 128.
95 See id. at 169.
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dominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) had not been met.9 Looking
to the choice-of-law principles of Missouri, the forum state,97 the court
found that Missouri would use the "most significant relationship" test
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine which
state law would apply to each claim." The court concluded that "a
class action for breach of fiduciary duty would not present questions of
law common to the class and would in fact involve the application of
the law of virtually every state in the Union."9
Rental Car v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.100 provides another
example. In Rental Car, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts found that Massachusetts conflicts rules pointed
to the law of the place of the wrong in cases involving tort claims."'
Thus, in the plaintiffs' class action claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
the court would have had to apply the law of each state in which fidu-
ciary duties to the plaintiff class members arose and were broken-the
"place of the wrong."102 The resultant choice-of-law problems de-
stroyed the possibility that common questions of law would
predominate over individual questions, and the class was not
" See id. at 171-72.
97 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), requires that fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. See id.
at 496. Federal courts must use the forum state's choice-of-law rules in adjudicating
state-law claims brought under diversity jurisdiction, state-law claims brought pendent
to actions involving federal questions, and federal actions that look to state substantive
law. A federal court's application of the forum state's substantive law is subject to the
constitutional limits that Hague places on any choice of forum law.
For pendent state law claims raising choice-of-law issues to be decided under the
law of the forum state, see, for example, In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D.
443, 455 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (denying class treatment of state-law fraud claims pendent to
a federal securities action). For actions under federal statutes that look to the substan-
tive law of the forum state, see Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp.
595, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding class certification inappropriate for an action
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), which
looks to state law for the definition of "implied warranty"); Harrigan v. United States,
63 F.R.D. 402, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("[T]he substantive law of the state wherein the
cause of action accrues . . . governs the liability of the United States on claims brought
under the [Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)]."). See also L. Loss, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIS REGULATION 1167-68 (1983) (discussing the application of
state statutes of limitations to implied rights of action under the federal securities laws).
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), requires that a
number of special procedures be followed in class actions brought under that Act. See
id. § 2310(e).
98 See Chmieleski, 71 F.R.D. at 169.
99 Id.
100 496 F. Supp. 373 (D. Mass. 1980).
501 See id. at 381; see also supra note 19 (discussing various choice-of-law rules
for actions in tort and contract).




B. The Effects of Shutts
The Court's decision in Shutts permits the assertion of jurisdiction
over nonresident plaintiffs in a class action who have no contacts of any
sort with the forum; most nonresident plaintiffs will not appear before
the court, and the matters being litigated may have occurred in other
jurisdictions.1°' The result is that for many class members the only con-
tact with the forum may be the litigation itself.
At the same time, however, the Court held that any application of
forum law, whether in individual or class action litigation, must meet
the constitutional requirements of Hague: contacts between the forum,
the parties, and the litigation must be "significant" and give rise to
state "interests" so that application of forum law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair.105 Thus, in many class actions involving
plaintiffs from numerous states, a court may be permitted to assert ju-
risdiction over all claims but foreclosed from resolving those claims
through the straightforward application of a single state's law.
The Shutts decision therefore presents the courts with some diffi-
cult choices. The requirements of commonality, predominance, and
manageability in class action procedure previously encouraged courts
either to deny certification to a class or to certify it under forum law.
With the latter approach now ruled out by Shutts, some courts may
feel compelled simply to dismiss class actions that present choice-of-law
problems. Yet outright dismissal is not the only remaining approach. In
the following section, alternatives are proposed that, if used properly,
can assure the continued vitality of the class action. 06
los See id.; accord Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 929-30 (N.D. Ind.
1984); McMerty v. Burtness, 72 F.R.D. 450, 456 (D. Minn. 1976).
104 See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2978-81.
105 See id.
110 Some of the approaches suggested here raise issues concerning offensive non-
mutual collateral estoppel. In some cases, these approaches will lead to the noncertifica-
tion of some class members, and a judgment for the plaintiffs who remain members of
the class arguably could be used by the noncertified class members in subsequent suits
against the defendants. Under the theory of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel ar-
ticulated in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), however, noncertified
plaintiffs may not make offensive use of collateral estoppel if for any reason such use
would be unfair to the defendants. Cf id. at 331 (upholding the plaintiffs' use of offen-
sive collateral estoppel based on an earlier declaratory judgment obtained by the SEC
on essentially the same matter). Such unfairness may result, for example, in circum-
stances in which as a result of a choice-of-law determination the defendant did not have
a sufficient incentive to litigate the issue in the first action. For a discussion of the use
of offensive collateral estoppel in cases in which plaintiffs opt out of the class, see 3 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 32, at § 16.27.
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III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. Subclasses
In class actions in which foreign states' substantive laws must be
applied, class action procedure provides for application of those laws, at
the court's discretion, through the use of subclasses."' 7 In forming these
subclasses, the court will be guided by choice-of-law principles.'08
In Shutts, for example, both Kansas' choice-of-law rules and those
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws pointed to the laws of
the states in which the leaseholds at issue were located.' 0 9 There were
eleven such states, including Kansas," ° and the plaintiff class could
thus have been broken up into eleven subclasses according to the loca-
tion of the leaseholds. The contacts with these states would include the
defendant's business activities, the land on which the royalties were
earned, and the lease itself. These contacts would support a choice of
law that could be found constitutional under the standard set forth in
Hague."'
The adjudication of the Shutts claims under such an arrangement
107 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B); UNIF. CLASS AcTIONs RULE § 2(c)(3), 12
U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1986).
'08 Courts have, on occasion, used this approach as a solution to class actions
presenting choice-of-law problems. See, e.g., In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.,
725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.) (holding that the use of subclasses corresponding to varia-
tions in state law was not palpable error), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Pruitt v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 113 (E.D. Va. 1980) (forming six subclasses based
on choice-of-law rules in order to maintain "the advantages and economies to be
achieved by a single adjudication of common issues" in class actions); O'Brien v. Shear-
son Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 688, 586 P.2d 830, 834-35 (1978) (en bane)
("[O]n remand the trial court is directed to divide the certified class into subclasses
which will allow proper treatment under the conflict of laws analysis set forth
herein."), amended en banc, 95 Wash. 2d 51, 605 P.2d 779 (1980).
109 Kansas' choice-of-law rules point to the place of contracting for actions in con-
tract. See Ellis v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 116 Kan. 144, 145, 225 P. 1072, 1073
(1924); Simms v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 640, 642, 685 P.2d 321,
324 (1984). The litigation in Shutts concerned the terms of oil and gas royalty contracts
made in various states. See Shutts, 235 Kan. at 217-19, 679 P.2d at 1178. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws looks to the following factors when choosing the law
to govern contracts: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the
contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the
contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place
of business of the parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 188(2) (1971). All of these factors point to the state where the leased oil and gas
lands were located.
110 See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2968.
"I" The fact that a royalty lease covered land in a particular state would virtually
guarantee that that state had the requisite interests in having its law applied to those
leases. Cf. R. LEFLAR, supra note 39, § 108, at 216-17 (discussing choice of law in
different types of cases involving land).
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would be fair to both plaintiffs and defendants. It would provide uni-
form treatment to plaintiffs who are similarly situated by virtue of their
leasehold interests in the same state. Furthermore, the defendant's legit-
imate expectations regarding the law applicable to its activities in any
given state would be met.112 Finally, each state's interest in having its
oil and gas laws applied to in-state oil and gas transactions would be
respected. Kansas would no longer act as the regional arbiter of oil and
gas policy by virtue of its status as a forum for a class action suit.
B. Partial Dismissal
Under the subclass approach, several situations will call for the
court to dismiss all or part of the class action before it. The first occurs
when the number of subclasses required is so large as to render the
class action inefficient. Another occurs when the subclass representing
forum interests is so small that the task of adjudicating all of the class's
claims is not worthwhile. A third occurs when the membership of par-
ticular subclasses is too small to meet the numerosity requirement of
Rule 23.
Miner v. Gillette Co. 1" provides an example of the first situation.
The plaintiff class in Miner included residents of all fifty states. Thus,
although the facts giving rise to the several thousand claims were virtu-
ally identical, the case implicated individual questions of law requiring
resolution under as many as fifty separate jurisdictions." 4 The majority
reasoned, however, that the differing laws of the states might be
grouped into a manageable number of subclasses in which common
questions of fact would predominate. 5
Judge Ryan recognized in dissent, however, that whether any
number of subclasses is manageable depends on the judicial resources
112 For example, the Phillips Petroleum Company entered into contracts on leases
covering land in Texas. According to the Court in Shutts, use of Texas law rather than
Kansas law would mean that interest on royalty monies would be awarded based on a
substantially lower interest rate. See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2978. But see id. at 2989
n.22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing the majority's
suggestion that Texas courts would have applied a lower interest rate). Indeed, under
an exception peculiar to Texas law Phillips might have been excused altogether from
some of the interest payments at issue in Shutts. See id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Riverview Gas Compression Co., 409 F. Supp. 486, 493-97 (N.D. Tex. 1976)). But
see id. at 2989 n.22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that this exception would not have applied to the Shutts case).
11 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. dismissed per curiam, 459 U.S. 86
(1982).
114 See id. at 17, 428 N.E.2d at 483-84.
115 See id.
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that are devoted to the litigation." 6 In a case in which the number of
subclasses is great, the litigation might be manageable if sufficient judi-
cial resources are devoted to it, but use of the class action procedure in
such a case might very well be inefficient.
In cases in which a significant resident subclass exists, however, a
forum could deny certification to class members who were unable to
plead forum law.117 In Miner, several thousand Illinois residents were
included in the class, and various nonresidents might have been able to
plead Illinois law. 8 The Miner court could have denied certification to
the remainder of the class; these parties presumably could pursue
claims in their own jurisdictions or join a class elsewhere. " 9
The second problem pointed out above concerns the question
"whether the forum state itself has an interest . . .strong enough to
justify adjudicating the claims of non-residents. 1 20 If the Kansas court
in Shutts were to consider the subclass approach, it might find that the
Kansas interests represented by the class as a whole were so insignifi-
cant that Kansas was not the best place to resolve the dispute.1 21 Dis-
missal of the suit on forum non conveniens grounds would be an appro-
priate response, leaving Kansas residents or leaseholders free to proceed
with more limited actions in the Kansas courts or to join a newly con-
stituted class in a jurisdiction such as Texas or Oklahoma, where fo-
rum interests would be great enough to justify adjudication of the
dispute.122
The third problem identified above arises in connection with the
118 See id. at 27, 428 N.E.2d at 488-89 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
1 A federal district court took this approach in In re Northern Dist. of Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-95 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (limiting the class to California residents to avoid choice-of-law problems), rev'd
on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1981).
See also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 386 n.1 (D. Mass. 1979) (restricting
the class to those with claims justiciable under forum law), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336
(D. Mass. 1983).
118 See Miner, 87 Ill. 2d at 11, 428 N.E.2d at 480-81. The claims of nonresidents
who subscribed to the promotion in Illinois or through the Illinois branch of Gillette
might be justiciable under Illinois law.
"1 See Firsch, Notice, Costs, and the Effect ofJudgment in Missouri's New Com-
mon-Question Class Action, 38 Mo. L. REv. 173, 211 (1973) (arguing that neither
forum interests nor efficiency goals are threatened by denying certification to nonresi-
dents who may pursue class or individual action elsewhere).
120 Id.
"" Of the nearly 20,000 leaseholds at issue in Shutts, only 22 were in Kansas.
Moreover, only approximately $3,000 of the more than $11,000,000 in contested royal-
ties was attributable to Kansas leaseholds. See Shutts, 235 Kan. at 199, 679 P.2d at
1166.
"' Most of the leaseholds at issue were in Texas and Oklahoma. See Shutts, 105




numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1),12 3 which is a cornerstone of
the efficiency goal of class action procedure. Where only a few class
members are from a particular state whose law must be applied under
Shutts, a subclass consisting of those persons will not meet the numer-
osity requirement, and dismissal of those persons will be appropriate.
C. Interstate Certification
The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,12 4 currently
in effect in twenty-three states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
allows a state court to answer questions of state law that have been
certified to it by federal courts or other state courts.1 25 The certification
procedure makes it far easier for a forum to discover the proper foreign
law applicable to a class action or subclass before it. Under this proce-
dure, the forum court need decide only what subclasses are necessary,
and then have questions of foreign law certified to the appropriate for-
eign courts. The use of certification in this manner would alleviate the
problems of manageability that occur when the forum court tries to
ascertain and apply foreign law, and would thereby preserve the class
action as an efficient procedural device for the righting of mass wrongs.
At the same time, it would satisfy the fairness concerns emphasized in
Shutts by making it unnecessary to apply forum law in order to avoid
choice-of-law problems.
Shutts illustrates the kind of case in which certification can be
particularly useful. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court must ascer-
tain and apply the foreign laws applicable to the claims of plaintiff
class members to which Kansas law cannot be applied.12 1 Moreover, in
at least one state, Oklahoma, there are no recorded decisions concerning
interest liability on suspended lease royalties of the type at issue in
Shutts.127 Oklahoma, however, has adopted the Uniform Certification
of Questions of Law Act and allows other states to request rulings on
its law.' 28 On remand, then, the Kansas court could use the certifica-
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
124 UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW AcT, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1975).
125 See id. For a listing of the 26 states that have adopted at least part of the
Uniform Act, see 12 U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1986). Approximately one-half of these states
have adopted the Act's state-to-state certification clause in addition to the clause permit-
ting answers to questions certified by the federal courts. The remaining states provide
only for federal-to-state certification. For a general discussion of interjurisdictional cer-
tification, see Comment, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification and Full Faith and Credit
in Federal Courts, 45 WASH. L. Rav. 167 (1970).
126 See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2979.
127 See id. at 2977.
112 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1612 (West Supp. 1985). West Virginia,
another state in which Shutts leaseholds and class members are located, has a similar
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tion device to enlist the aid of the Oklahoma state courts in deciding the
liability standard for the more than 4,000 Oklahoma leases at issue in
the litigation.
129
Certification can promote accurate decisionmaking as well as effi-
ciency. Judges in one state can never behave precisely like judges in
another, and they will inevitably be less familiar with the law and
principles of the other states. Thus, one can never say in the abstract
that the court of the forum will apply foreign law "just like" it would
be applied in the foreign jurisdiction itself.130 The proper application of
foreign law is especially important in class actions, in which the magni-
tude of the aggregated claims is so great. Certifying questions of foreign
law to the appropriate foreign courts not only frees the forum court
from having to ascertain and apply foreign law, but also helps to en-
sure that these determinations are made correctly.
CONCLUSION
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court addressed
for the first time the issues of jurisdiction and choice of law in the class
action setting. By lowering the jurisdictional requirements applicable to
multistate plaintiff class actions, Shutts allows courts to exercise juris-
diction over nonresident plaintiffs who have had little or no contact
with the forum. Shutts requires only that plaintiff class members re-
ceive adequate notice of the suit and an opportunity to opt out. At the
same time, however, Shutts permits courts that exercise jurisdiction
over multistate plaintiffs to apply forum law to class claims only if the
choice-of-law standards enunciated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague
are met. Those standards, however, require contacts and state interests
of a sort that will not be found among class members whose only con-
tact with the forum is the litigation itself.
The tension between these two standards exists because procedural
rules that are intended to ensure that class actions are efficient and
manageable encourage the uniform application of forum law to all class
members. Some courts have applied forum law to all the claims before
them, while other courts have used the commonality, predominance, or
manageability requirements of Rule 23 to dismiss class actions that
presented choice-of-law problems. If the Shutts standards are to be rec-
onciled, and if class actions are to remain a viable means of resolving
provision. See 15 W. VA. CODE §§ 51-1A-1 to -12 (1981).
"" See Shutts, 105 S. Ct. at 2977 (describing the location of the various leaseholds
at issue in the case).
"so See supra note 85.
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disputes involving multistate plaintiffs, courts must begin to accommo-
date class action procedure to the choice-of-law process. Creative use of
subclasses formed by reference to choice-of-law principles is one means
of achieving such accommodation. Another is the tailoring of the class
to reflect the scope of the forum's interest in the litigation. Finally, the
further adoption and use of the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act would be of great assistance to courts undertaking either of
these options. Throughout, a balance must be maintained between the
fairness and federalism interests emphasized in Hague and the effi-
ciency goals of class action procedure.

